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Executive Summary
Cotton subsidies and their impact on international 
prices and on the livelihoods of poor African 
cotton farmers have become a central focus of the 
Doha Development Round of World Trade Organi­
zation [WTO] negotiations. Cotton subsidies have 
taken a high profile in part because cotton is a 
critical crop for some of the world's poorest coun­
tries, including the “Cotton 4" countries of Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. Another reason for 
this attention is that middle-income countries such 
as Brazil and China have a great deal at stake in 
cotton trade and much to gain through the elimi­
nation and reform of U.S. cotton subsidies.
Because of the prominent role cotton plays in the 
economies of "Cotton 4" countries, a small decline 
in cotton prices can make an enormous difference 
in the ability of their farmers to pay for health 
care, education, and food. A good price for cotton 
allows farmers to boost production of subsistence 
crops, slows urbanization by keeping people in 
rural areas, and creates localized wealth in rural 
places that need it most.
Opponents of the U.S. cotton subsidy program 
argue that it is trade distorting, because it results in 
at least a 10 percent reduction in global cotton 
prices. They also assert that it is a burden on U.S. 
taxpayers to keep afloat an inefficient industry that 
would not be profitable without subsidies. Advo­
cates of the program argue that larger factors are 
at play in the world cotton price and that the 
impact of U.S. subsidies is negligible.
Cotton producers in the United States, West 
Africa, and middle-income cotton countries have a 
great deal at stake in the debate over subsidies. The 
WTO is also a major stakeholder, because some 
observers see cotton as a litmus test of whether or 
not the WTO is capable of serving the interests of 
less powerful countries and poor people. Important 
questions for all parties include who the real win­
ners will be if subsidies are reformed or eliminated, 
what the alternatives are for cotton producers who 
cannot compete in the global market, and what 
kind of leverage the world's poorest producers 
might have in future trade negotiations.
Your assignment is to prepare cotton subsidy 
recommendations for the next U.S. farm bill that 
would be acceptable to all stakeholder groups.
Discuss policy issues regarding support for and 
resistance to the recommendations, justify these 
recommendations, and assess the consequences for 
stakeholder groups.
Background
The Doha Round of trade negotiations, which 
aimed to redress the inequities of the Uruguay 
Round, called itself a development round and 
sought to place agriculture at the heart of the 
agenda. The negotiations collapsed in 2006 owing 
to intransigence on the part of the European 
Union [EU] and the United States regarding subsi­
dies and tariffs. Even though cotton subsidies 
account for just 1 percent of agricultural subsidies 
in countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [OECD], cotton is 
the commodity most often credited for unraveling 
negotiations, and its subsidies have served as a 
poster child for unfair trade practices worldwide 
[Heinisch 2006; Williams 2003], The inequities of 
trade policy in the cotton sector are most vividly 
illustrated in the plight of West African producers. 
In the "Cotton 4" countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Chad, and Mali, gains from aid are overshadowed 
by losses in cotton trade due to current trade poli­
cies. The shares of people living on less than US$1 a 
day in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali are 41 percent, 
27 percent, and 72 percent, respectively [World 
Bank 2006], The figure for Chad is not available, 
but this country ranked 173rd out of 177 countries 
on the 2003 United Nations Human Development 
Index [UNDP 2005], Given that these are four of 
the poorest countries in the world, their ability to 
compete in a global market with a commodity for 
which they have a significant comparative advantage 
is crucial for their development.
Francophone Africa's position in world cotton 
production, consumption, and trade—along with 
that of other regions around the world—is charted 
in Figures 1 through 3.1 Figures 1 and 2 present 
worldwide production and consumption patterns. 
Francophone Africa is the world's seventh-Iargest
1 Although these figures include African countries 
outside of the "Cotton 4," the majority of African 
cotton exports come from these four countries.
producer of cotton, producing 4 percent of the 
world's total supply. The top five cotton-producing 
countries, along with their share of overall world 
production, are China [26 percent], the United 
States [19 percent], India [18 percent], Pakistan [8
percent], and Brazil [S percent]. The five largest 
consumers of cotton, along with their share of 
overall world consumption, are China [41 percent], 
India [15 percent], Pakistan [10 percent], Turkey [5 
percent], and the United States [4 percent].
Figure 1: W orld  C o tto n  P roduction> 2 0 0 7
Source: Cotton Incorporated 2007.
F ig u re  2 : W orld  C o tton  Consum ption> 2 0 0 7
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Source: Cotton Incorporated 2007.
Figure 3 illustrates Francophone Africa's role in 
cotton trade compared with that of other cotton­
exporting regions around the world. Francophone 
Africa produces approximately 10 percent of all 
cotton traded internationally, 22 percent of which 
is exported to the EU and 56 percent of which is 
exported to Asia. The United States produces 
about 40 percent of all exported cotton, providing 
11 percent of its total exports to Turkey, 17 percent 
to Mexico, and 48 percent to Asia. Uzbekistan is 
also a major player in cotton markets. Like Franco­
phone Africa, this country produces about 10 per­
cent of the world's exported cotton, exporting 20 
percent of its cotton to Europe and 37 percent to 
Asia. Australia and India each account for just over 
2 percent of cotton exports, with the former 
sending 95 percent of its exports to Asia and 5 
percent to Europe.
The Importance of Cotton in the West 
African Economy
For many years, cotton was considered the "white 
gold" of several West and Central African coun­
tries. The region's comparative advantage in the 
commodity is in large part what makes its farmers 
the most cost-efficient cotton producers in the 
world. Production costs for a farmer in Benin are 
estimated to be around US$0.30 per pound, 
whereas the cost for the average U.S. farmer is 
around US$0.68 per pound [ICAC 2001], Not only 
is labor cheaper in West Africa, but cotton pro­
duced there is also higher in quality because it is 
hand-picked and therefore "cleaner" than that 
picked mechanically.2 Cotton in this region is also 
entirely rain fed, whereas 55 percent of cotton area 
in the rest of the world is irrigated [Estur 2005b], 
Because conditions in this part of the world are so 
amenable to cotton production, more than 10 
million people now depend on the commodity for 
their livelihoods in West and Central Africa. 
Ninety-seven percent of West African cotton is 
exported, and the crop accounts for around one- 
third of total exports for both Benin and Burkina
2 Although the quality of the fiber is superior to that of 
U.S. cotton, contamination during picking and storage 
"annihilates" this comparative advantage to the extent 
that the price of hand-picked cotton is discounted rela­
tive to machine-picked cotton. Some mills even refuse to 
buy manually harvested cotton to avoid complaints about 
low quality [Estur 2005a].
Faso [Estur 2005a], In Benin, approximately half of 
all households rely on cotton for a portion of their 
income. In Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and 
Togo, cotton is responsible for between 2 and 5 
percent of gross domestic product [GDP] [Oxfam 
2005], In comparison, the entire agriculture indus­
try in the United States accounts for 2 percent of 
GDP, with cotton contributing 0.0004 percent of 
U.S. GDP [World Bank, cited in Oxfam 2005],
Because of the prominent role that cotton plays in 
many West and Central African countries, a small 
decline in cotton prices can make an enormous 
difference in the ability of these countries' farmers 
to pay for health care, education, and food. A 
good price for cotton allows farmers to boost 
production of subsistence crops. It also keeps rural 
people from fleeing to urban centers to find 
employment, and by creating localized wealth, it 
encourages development of locally based initiatives 
and activities [Caritas-CIDSE 2004], As might be 
expected, low prices have the opposite effect on 
rural cotton farmers. A study by the International 
Food Policy Research Institute [IFPRI] for the 
World Bank found that a 40 percent reduction in 
farm-level cotton prices leads to a 21 percent reduc­
tion in income and a 20 percent rise in poverty for 
cotton farmers [Minot and Daniels 2002],
U.S. Cotton Production and Subsidy 
Program
The history of cotton production in the United 
State parallels that of other farm sectors, with a 
marked trend toward concentration of production 
occurring in the latter half of the 20th century. In 
1930 nearly one-third of the 6.3 million farms in 
the United States produced cotton. In that year 13 
million bales of cotton were produced on 42 
million acres. Seventy-five years later there were 
fewer than 25,000 cotton farms in the United 
States, and the crop reached a record of 23 million 
bales grown on 13.7 million acres [Estur 2005a]. 
The high levels of cotton production in the United 
States have coincided with a downturn in domestic 
demand. As a result, cotton exports increased to 
76 percent of production in 2003, which 
amounted to a 41 percent share of world exports.
F igure 3 : Leading C o tton  E xporters, 2 0 0 4 —2 0 0 6  
(accounting fo r  three-quarters o f w o rld  trade)
Million bales
1! USDA reports cotton data for 10 of the 14 Franc Zone countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, Togo, and Niger.
Source: USDA 2006.
This kind of production would not be possible 
without government assistance [see Box 1], Between 
1998 and 2002, the United States spent US$14.8 
billion to subsidize cotton valued at US$21.6 billion, 
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates 
that without subsidies, the average U.S. cotton 
farmer would have lost US$871 for each acre of 
cotton planted from 1998 to 2004 [Oxfam 2004], 
Current subsidy levels were legislated in the 2002 
Farm Bill, which guaranteed a minimum price of 
US$0.71 per pound to U.S. cotton producers. 
When the 2002 Farm Bill was passed, average 
world prices were around US$0.40 a pound, 
although prices have since risen to about US$0.57 
per pound. The total amount of cotton subsidies 
distributed to producers in the crop year 
2004/2005 was US$4.2 billion, which was also the 
estimated total value of the crop that year [Oxfam 
2005],
Not all U.S. farmers are eligible for subsidies, and 
in fact most are not. According to the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture [USDA], 60 percent of 
all farmers and ranchers do not collect government 
subsidy payments, primarily because the crops and 
livestock they produce do not qualify for subsidy
programs.3 Among farmers who qualified for sub­
sidies in 2004,10 percent of the largest producers 
received 73 percent of ail subsidies. Recipients in 
that category received an average of US$86,388 in 
annual payments, while the bottom 80 percent of 
recipients received only US$1,601 on average per 
year. The 22 top producers received more than 
US$1 million in subsidies [Environmental Working 
Group 2006]. The disparities in subsidies reveal 
that the U.S. program not only disadvantages poor, 
small-scale farmers in developing countries, but also 
puts at risk the livelihoods of those kinds of 
farmers in the United States.
The most controversial subsidy program in the 
cotton sector is the "Step 2" cotton program, 
which cost taxpayers US$264 million in 2004. This 
program funnels tax money to U.S.-based cotton 
millers and exporters so they can buy domestically 
grown cotton instead of cheaper foreign cotton. 
These subsidies then allow this cotton to be ex­
ported [or "dumped"] at prices that can be lower 
than the cost of production. The top 10 recipients 
of Step 2 subsidies in 2004 received 61 percent of 
the total paid out that year, with payments ranging
3 For a list of the top subsidy recipients in the United 
States, visit
http: / / www.ews.org/ farm /region.php?fips=00000.
from US$9 million to more than US$34 million for 
the largest cotton merchant, Allenburg Cotton 
Company of Cordova, Tennessee [Cook and 
Campbell 2005], The WTO ruled these Step 2 
payments illegal in a case Brazil brought against the 
United States in 2004, and the United States has 
eliminated them, arguing that it is now in
compliance with the panel ruling. Brazil is asking for 
further U.S. subsidy reform and has asked for a 
WTO compliance panel. [For more information on 
the case, see the case study "The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism: The Brazil-U.S. Cotton 
Case, by Fuzhi Cheng, in this series.]
Box 1: The U.S. Cotton Subsidy Program
U.S. government subsidies to cotton producers come in a variety of forms and have a 
wide range of purposes, including minimizing environmental impacts, providing disaster 
assistance, controlling pests, offering credit assistance, and subsidizing irrigation that 
provides water to Western states. The following list [adapted from Cross 2006] is not 
exhaustive, but it includes the kinds of subsidies most often referred to in debates over 
the U.S. subsidy program.
Marketing loan payments -  Farmers use their crops as collateral for a loan from the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation [CCC], When the 
world price for cotton falls below the given loan rate, the borrower can repay the loan 
at the lower price and retain the difference.
Direct payments -  These payments are generally tied to fixed, historical production 
levels and are an example of decoupled income support, meaning that they are not 
related to market price fluctuations or levels of production. They are therefore 
sometimes considered less trade distorting than other types of payments.
Countercyclical payments and emergency assistance -  Countercyclical payments, 
based on historical production levels, are designed to protect farmers against a decline 
in prices and are triggered when the market price for cotton falls below a target price. 
They are decoupled from payments to offset low commodity prices.
Crop insurance -  Insurance is provided through private insurers at a subsidized rate to 
protect farmers against losses caused by natural disasters. The USDA's Risk Management 
Agency pays more than 50 percent of the premiums and makes additional payments to 
the insurers for administrative costs. Any losses over the premiums are also paid by the 
government.
Export credit guarantees -  A minimum of US$5.5 billion is made available by the 
CCC to provide government guarantees on the repayment of private loans to finance 
exporter sales of cotton and other commodities. These guarantees are intended to 
encourage exports of agricultural products to foreign countries where financing might 
not be available.
"Step 2" payments -  These payments encourage buyers [like yarn and textile 
manufacturers and cotton exporters] to purchase U.S. cotton by providing a subsidy to 
do so when the lowest price for the cotton exceeds a benchmark price for Northern 
European cotton over a consecutive four-week period.
The E nd  of th e  M ulti-F iber A rrangem en t 
Cotton is one of the world's most important textile 
fibers, accounting for more than half of all the 
fibers used in clothing and household furnishings 
[ICAC 2004], West African countries—indeed the 
African continent as a whole—have been unable to 
play more than a marginal role in the market for 
value-added goods despite their share in the world 
cotton market. Although the cotton-producing 
countries in West Africa account for just 4 percent 
of world cotton production, roughly 90 percent of 
their crop is exported as raw fiber, thus making 
them a more significant player in global cotton 
trade [Adams 2006], The textile industry in Africa 
suffers owing to a number of factors, including a 
lack of qualified personnel and capital to finance 
investment, costly energy and transport, landlocked 
cotton-producing countries, a weak internal 
market, and competition from imports, particularly 
of second-hand clothing. The world textile market 
is also subject to a great deal of distortion, par­
ticularly in the world yarn market. All of these 
factors highlight the persistent importance of raw 
cotton exports for West African farmers [Estur 
2005b],
Much of the market distortion in the world textile 
trade was due to the Multi-Fiber Arrangement 
[MFA], which later became the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing and was phased out between 
1995 and 2005. This agreement effectively excluded 
Sub-Saharan African countries from the textile 
market, which comprises yarn and fabrics.4 The 
degree to which the end of the agreement will help 
Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is seriously under 
question. Developing countries had believed that 
the phasing out of the MFA by January 1, 2005, 
would provide them with the opportunity to 
industrialize through textiles and apparel. These 
markets have been captured, however, by a few of 
the strongest developing countries, and most 
developing countries have been left on the 
sidelines.
Particularly in China, the demise of the MFA led to 
a massive increase in clothing exports to the EU 
and United States, both of whom reacted by 
imposing new import quotas. These new quotas
4 For more information on the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 
see the case study "The Termination of the International 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing," by Jill S. Shemin, 
in this series.
were possible through a special provision, made 
when China joined the WTO in 2001, that allows 
countries to impose limits on textile imports until 
the end of 2008 if doing so will prevent market- 
disrupting surges. Accordingly, in June 2005 the 
EU signed an agreement to restrict the growth 
level of 10 categories of textile and clothing 
imports to between 8 and 12.5 percent annually 
until the end of 2007. In November 2005 the 
United States and China agreed to place quotas on 
34 categories of Chinese textile and clothing 
imports beginning January 1, 2006. The quotas 
increase annually: 8-10 percent of U.S. textile 
imports can come from China in 2006, 10-16 
percent in 2007, and 15-17 percent in 2008 
[Hufbauer et al. 2006],
Policy Issues
Factors Affecting the World Market Price of 
Cotton
In its case against the United States at the WTO, 
Brazil asserted that world cotton prices would be 
12.6 percent higher if certain U.S. farm programs 
were removed. The Food and Agriculture Organi­
zation of the United Nations [FAO] and the Inter­
national Monetary Fund [IMF] both estimate the 
potential increase to be around 2 percent [USTR 
2004], With the exceptions of 2003 and 2004, 
stocks over the past 10 years have remained rela­
tively steady at more than 10 million tons. Over 
this same period the Cotlook Index has been 
declining and in 2006 was US$0.56 cents per 
pound [Cotlook 2006].5
Despite their demonstrated effects on cotton 
prices, subsidies are not the only external force at 
play concerning this issue. Additional factors hav­
ing an adverse affect on global cotton prices 
include exchange rates, competition from less 
expensive synthetic fibers, China's decreasing con­
sumption of and demand for cotton imports, the 
entrance of new producers in Brazil, Turkey, and
5 The Cotlook A Index is the average of the cheapest five 
quotations from a selection of the main internationally 
traded upland cottons. Using this average is a means of 
identifying the growths that are the most competitive 
and therefore the likeliest to be traded in the most 
volume. This practice is a proxy for weighting, because 
the absence of timely data by which weighting could be 
calculated makes it impractical [Cotlook 2006].
Central Asia, and decreasing demand for com­
modities following the Asian economic crisis of 
1997 [USTR 2004],
Non-U.S. Cotton Subsidies
The United States is not the only country whose 
cotton subsidies have deleterious effects on the 
viability of West African cotton farmers. Although 
the EU is not as large a player in the global cotton 
market, more than 100,000 cotton farmers in 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain receive nearly US$1 
billion in subsidies every year. Because the EU is 
Africa's largest trading partner, its subsidies are 
particularly harmful for Sub-Saharan African 
farmers, who are cut off from the self-sufficient 
European cotton market. Although the EU does 
not export cotton, its production still results in 
downward pressure on prices by contributing to 
increasing global supply. Cotton farming in the EU 
occurs in lower-income regions, and those regions 
often offer few economically attractively alter­
natives to cotton production. The EU thus sees its 
cotton income and support program as a justified 
mechanism to help small, low-income producers 
who have an average farm size of just over 12 acres 
and a limited impact on the world cotton market. 
The EU has undertaken a reform of its cotton sub­
sidies, although the legality of this reform was 
challenged in a recent European Court of Justice 
opinion.
As the world's largest producer and importer of 
cotton, China's role in cotton trade is monumental 
and growing. Despite the country's high levels of 
production, China's growing textile sector requires 
more cotton than the country produces. Although 
China's consumption of cotton has been increasing 
steadily since 1970, production has been volatile. In 
2003 stocks were exhausted entirely when con­
sumption surpassed production by almost 2 million 
tons.
The Political Economy of Trude
In July 2006 the Doha Round of WTO collapsed 
after five years of negotiations. This round was 
intended to make globalization more inclusive of 
the world's poorest countries by reducing subsi­
dies, tariffs, quotas, and other barriers to trade 
erected by more developed countries. The EU and 
the United States could not agree on the specifics 
of those reductions: the United States argued that
the EU was not doing enough about tariffs, and 
the EU asserted that the United States was not 
serious about reducing its subsidies. Genuine dif­
ferences about whether the interests of the poor 
are best served by lower tariffs or more special 
protection contributed to the impasse. A larger 
factor at play, however, was the powerful influence 
of lobbies.
Farmers and rural sectors enjoy a great deal of 
cultural and political support in nearly all countries. 
With large-scale producers entering the picture 
over the past few decades, popular support has 
been reinforced by powerful political lobbies from 
industry and agribusiness. Nonetheless, direct pay­
ments to farmers that are tied to production, along 
with high retail prices supported by trade barriers, 
are losing legitimacy and credibility in the public 
sphere. Even though negotiations to reduce gov­
ernment measures in agriculture involve complex 
trade-offs, pressure is increasing to level the play­
ing field as subsides continue to garner inter­
national attention.
The end of the Doha Round may lead to growth in 
bilateral trade negotiations, which work to the dis­
advantage of poorer and less powerful countries. In 
bilateral negotiations they are no longer able to 
work collectively and increase their leverage in 
negotiations with countries such as the United 
States.
One of the obstacles to addressing the cotton issue 
is that it is difficult to negotiate agricultural sub­
sidies country by country, and it is nearly impossi­
ble to reduce payments for one commodity with­
out also reducing payments for other commodities 
[Townsend 2003).
National-Level Factors in West African 
Countries
Because farming is a high-risk investment, govern­
ments need to be able to provide safety nets for 
their farmers when events such as crop failure, 
unpredictable weather, volatile markets, or related 
situations arise. Developing countries' ability to 
provide such support is limited by agricultural 
marketing reforms that liberalized markets by 
reducing or eliminating subsidies on agricultural 
inputs like fertilizers and credit.
Another national-level factor at play in the West 
African cotton industry is the colonial legacy of a 
monopolistic, parastatal ginning and marketing sys­
tem, which generates low revenue for cotton 
farmers. The system was originally designed to 
provide a fully integrated supply and marketing 
chain and provide for vital support services, such as 
research, extension, and infrastructure. At the 
behest of the World Bank and the IMF, a number 
of West African countries undertook reforms of 
the parastatal regimes, but the outcomes to date 
have been mixed. Now the system is sometimes 
seen as failing to serve the best interests of farmers 
and failing to provide competitive markets for their 
cotton production [Kherallah et al. 2002],
Stakeholders
West African Producers and Governments
In the crop year 2002, the United States govern­
ment's cotton subsidies totaled US$3.4 billion. This 
figure is nearly twice the total U.S. foreign aid 
given to Sub-Saharan Africa, and it is more than 
the combined GDP of the main cotton-producing 
countries in the region: Benin, Burkina Faso, and 
Chad [Oxfam 2004, 5], The losses these and other 
African countries incur owing to U.S. cotton sub­
sidies undermine the aid that they receive. For 
example, in 2002 Burkina Faso received US$10 
million in U.S. aid and Chad received US$5.7 
million, but each country lost nearly US$13.7 
million in export earnings. Togo received US$4 
million in U.S. aid, but lost almost twice that much 
in export earnings (Oxfam 2004], These losses in 
export revenue due to U.S. cotton subsidies also 
affect the ability of indebted countries to repay 
their debts, in 2002 the revenue losses for Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali equaled between 21 
and 33 percent of their total debt service payments.
In response to these kinds of losses, these same 
four countries led a West African initiative calling 
for an end to U.S. subsidies at Cancun in 2003. 
The ministers from these countries insisted that 
they were not asking for special treatment, but 
rather for wealthy countries to play by the same 
fair-trade rules they impose on others—not just 
the ones that operate in their favor. The outcome 
of this West African initiative, also known as the C- 
4 or cotton sectoral initiative, came to be seen as a 
litmus test of how far wealthy WTO members were 
prepared to go to put the Doha Round's
development principles into practice. When the 
talks at Cancun ended, cotton was considered by 
many to be the main issue over which they 
unraveled (Williams 2003],
The U.S. proposal at Cancun was rejected by the 
EU, Japan, and developing countries on the 
grounds that the export subsidies it would elimi­
nate were not used extensively by the United 
States; the lower tariffs it called for would hurt 
developing countries; and the production subsidies 
it would reduce would not affect the fixed pay­
ments that provide U.S. growers with approxi­
mately one-third of their total support. Likewise, 
the United States and the developing countries 
found the EU's proposal unacceptable, arguing that 
it would not reduce total support for agriculture 
and would result in only modest reductions in 
direct support to production and trade [Townsend 
2003],
West African governments have an important stake 
in what happens regarding subsidies as well. For 
some countries where cotton is the major agri­
cultural export commodity, their decision to par­
ticipate in the WTO is significantly linked to how 
decisions at the WTO facilitate sustainable cotton 
production and profitable participation in inter­
national trade. What is more, while these govern­
ments are already burdened with debt payments 
that make up a substantial percentage of their GDP, 
they are faced with the additional strain of sup­
porting farmers unable to get a good price for 
their cotton owing to overproduction made possi­
ble by subsidies in the West. In 2001 the govern­
ments of Benin and Mali spent US$20 million and 
US$14 million respectively averting a collapse of 
their cotton sectors by putting a price floor under 
the cotton market. IMF structural adjustment pro­
grams further reduce the leverage governments 
have to deal with the cotton situation. In 2002 the 
IMF would not allow the Beninese government to 
provide subsidies to its farmers, saying that doing 
so would breach fiscal deficit reduction targets. In 
Mali the World Bank required the government to 
reduce its producer price as a condition for 
adjustment loans (Oxfam 2004].
The U.S. Government and Producers
According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Repre­
sentative [USTR], U.S. farm programs do not 
distort trade, cause low cotton prices, or hurt
foreign growers. To support its case, the USTR 
points out that cotton prices actually increased 
during the two years following the 2002 Farm Bill 
and that U.S. cotton production and consumption 
have remained stable and even declined in recent 
years. Farmers are responding to market signals, as 
evidenced by the fact that they change cotton 
acreage from year to year, as farmers in the rest of 
the world do, and they base planting decisions in 
the spring on price projections for the fall.
The United States, which is the largest retail market 
for cotton, and the EU, which is the largest import 
market for textiles, assert that as net importers of 
cotton they are both helping to sustain the world 
cotton market. Additionally, U.S. industry and 
government contribute approximately US$60 
million per year in domestic and international 
cotton market development efforts. These efforts, 
which began in the 1950s, may boost world demand 
for cotton by more than subsidies boost U.S. 
production [Townsend 2003].
The WTO
The WTO has a great deal at stake in the outcome 
of cotton subsidy disputes. A report by Oxfam 
argues that cotton is a litmus test of whether or 
not the WTO—and trade itself—can in fact serve 
the interests of less powerful countries and poor 
people. If the WTO is to prove that it is capable of 
creating opportunities and removing distortions in 
global trade, it must be able to show effective 
leadership in the cotton sector. According to 
Mali's trade minister, Choquel Maiga, "The credi­
bility of the world trading system depends on 
resolving the cotton problem" [quoted in Williams 
2003, 21). Cross [2006, 188) states, "It cannot be 
assumed that developing countries will continue to 
participate in a WTO that is perceived to be 
inequitable."
Middle-Income Cotton-Producing 
Countries
If the United States were to reduce or eliminate its 
subsidies, Brazil would arguably gain the most in 
terms of increased exports [Pan et al. 2005). Effi­
ciency, higher yields, and scale of production posi­
tion the country to expand its role in markets 
where subsidized U.S. cotton dominates. With 
effective crop management and advances in agricul­
tural technology, Brazil has gone from being a net
cotton importer to a net cotton exporter in less 
than a decade, recently overtaking Turkey and 
Uzbekistan to become the world's fifth-Iargest 
cotton producer. Most of the growth in cotton 
production has occurred at large plantations in the 
central west region as well as in the northeast, 
where cotton acreage has doubled every year since 
2002 and is now expanding faster than acreage of 
soybeans, Brazil's leading agricultural export 
[Benson 2004). In 2004 the Brazilian Association 
of Cotton Producers projected that without U.S. 
cotton subsidies, the country could double its 
cotton production in just two years. Brazil's poten­
tial to become a bigger cotton exporter is boosted 
not only by favorable technology and infra­
structure, but also by the estimated 200 million 
acres available for planting [Benson 2004).
Policy Options
Hasten Elimination of Step 2 and Export 
Subsidies and Reform Other Subsidies
Aside from eliminating Step 2 subsidies, the United 
States has made no change in its marketing loan or 
countercyclical programs, which were named by the 
WTO panel as two of the three subsidies causing 
significant price suppression. The current support 
structure for U.S. cotton farmers is guaranteed by 
the current U.S. Farm Bill through August 2007. 
The current administration has indicated its intent 
to work with Congress to reduce cotton subsidies, 
and pressure to do so has increased owing to the 
rising cost of support, requirements of global 
agreements, and the rising levels of global aware­
ness and criticism of the impact of subsidies on 
farmers in developing countries. A poll by the Pro­
gram on International Policy Attitudes [PIPA) 
determined that "public attitudes on agricultural 
subsidies in the U.S. are very much at odds with 
the U.S. policies" [PIPA, cited in Heinisch 2006, 
269). A majority [77 percent) of people polled 
favored subsidies for small farmers but opposed 
them (65 percent) for large farmers. The report 
concludes that "the scope of subsidies the public 
supports is so much narrower than is currently 
provided that, if the public's preferences were fol­
lowed, this would largely remove the current 
obstacle in trade negotiations" (PIPA, cited in 
Heinisch 2006, 269).
Retribution against the United States
Brazil's successful case against the United States in 
the WTO may be signaling a broader shift within 
the WTO away from a system dominated by OECD 
countries toward a system that is increasingly influ­
enced by middle-income countries [Cross 2006]. 
Because of a number of political and economic 
factors, least-developed countries [LDCs] are not 
positioned to confront wealthy countries in the 
way that Brazil has been able to with its stronger 
economy. As Brazil's foreign minister Celso 
Amorim has stated, however, there may be a new 
"multipolar" dynamic at work within the WTO. An 
important question to consider is whether such a 
shift in power dynamics can work to the advantage 
of LDCs, whether or not their interests in a par­
ticular situation coincide with those of stronger 
middle-income countries.
An Agreement on an International System 
of Cotton Supply Management
Suppan [2006] lists an international agreement on 
cotton supply management as an important option 
for achieving stable and remunerative prices. The 
lack of any international supply or production 
management mechanism for cotton will continue to 
result in structural oversupply and low prices. Low 
prices encourage farmers to boost production at 
any cost, resulting in environmentally unsustainable 
methods. The Agreement on Agriculture does not 
adequately address this cycle of structural over­
supply, depressed prices, and environmentally 
unsustainable increases in cotton exports [Suppan 
2006],
Diversify Production
Interviews with farmers in the "Cotton 4" countries 
have revealed that many would prefer to replace 
cotton with other crops, but this option is not 
realistic because no other cash crops have the 
infrastructure that has been developed around the 
cotton sector. Additionally, the opportunities for 
growth that globalization promises have yet to be 
seen in these countries, as their economies are con­
sidered to have little to offer private investors 
[Decalo and Boudon 1997 cited in Heinisch 2006]. 
The Cotton 4 countries have invested heavily in 
cotton to bring them out of poverty and keep 
their economies stable, and the geographic location 
of the Sahel limits the kinds of crops that can be 
grown.
Assignment
Your assignment is to prepare cotton subsidy 
recommendations for the next U.S. farm bill that 
would be acceptable to all stakeholder groups. 
Discuss policy issues regarding support for and 
resistance to the recommendations, justify these 
recommendations, and assess the consequences for 
stakeholder groups.
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